Este artigo discute o padrão de mudança constitucional dos últimos 25 anos: altas taxas de emendamento e mudança endógena movida pela judicialização de questões políticas de alta visibilidade. O texto argumenta que a taxa de mudança no texto de nossa carta constitucional é indicador pobre de ativismo constitucional: a mudança constitucional de fundo tem acontecido no padrão de alta visibilidade da megapolítica. Esse padrão pode ser explicado pelas escolhas realizadas durante a constituinte: conteúdo detalhado da constituição e regras de emendamento relativamente permissivas. O artigo discute a estrutura de incentivos que levou a essas escolhas e sustenta que, ao contrário da experiência internacional, o ativismo constitucional tem ocorrido em um contexto de extensa constitucionalização. Mas a centralidade adquirida pelo stf na última década é inteiramente não antecipada pelos atores políticos.

This article discusses the pattern of changes in the Brazilian constitution since 1988: high amendment rates and endogenous change driven by the judicialization of high-visibility political issues. The article suggests that the change rate in the constitutional text is a poor indicator of constitutional activism: the relevant constitutional changes have been taking place in the high-visibility pattern of "megapolitics". This pattern can be explained by choices made during the constitution-making process: detailed content and relatively permissive amendment rules. The article discusses the incentive structure that leads to those choices and maintains that, in contrast to international experiences, constitutional activism has been taking place in an extensive constitutionalization process. But the political actors did not anticipate the central role of the Brazilian Supreme Court in the Brazilian political system in the last decade.

The received wisdom on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was that countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers and where multiparty coalitions prevailed would be doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries boasting weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate democratic rule. After almost two decades, it is now widely acknowledged that this prediction failed. Recent re-conceptualizations of presidentialism have partly corrected the flaws in the established diagnosis but left unexplained the role of checks and balances and of the rule of law in containing presidential abuse and guaranteeing governability. The paper argues that the key to solving the paradox of strong presidents and robust democracies is that democratic stability in Latin American countries is a function of an extended system of checks and balances. These are ultimately generated by power fragmentation at the time of the constitutional choices over their institutional design and political competition sustaining their effective functioning.

The received wisdom on Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s was that countries where presidents enjoyed strong constitutional powers and where multiparty coalitions prevailed would be doomed to instability and institutional crises, while countries boasting weak presidents and strong parties were expected to consolidate democratic rule. After almost two decades, it is now widely acknowledged that this prediction failed. Recent re-conceptualizations of presidentialism have partly corrected the flaws in the established diagnosis but left unexplained the role of checks and balances and of the rule of law in containing presidential abuse and guaranteeing governability. The paper argues that the key to solving the paradox of strong presidents and robust democracies is that democratic stability in Latin American countries is a function of an extended system of checks and balances. These are ultimately generated by power fragmentation at the time of the constitutional choices over their institutional design and political competition sustaining their effective functioning. s crises decades failed reconceptualizations re conceptualizations governability functioning

Este artigo examina as principais contribuições contemporâneas da literatura de política comparada e discute o viés majoritário existente nas contribuições recentes em torno da questão da qualidade da democracia. Esse viés manifesta-se de duas formas principais. Em primeiro lugar, pela redução da discussão da qualidade da democracia à questão da responsabilização (accountability) - conceito que está enraizado profundamente no ideal normativo majoritário. Em segundo lugar, pela assunção cada vez mais freqüente na área de política comparada de que a concentração de autoridade política é precondição para o exercício da responsabilização.

The article reviews the main recent contributions to the literature of comparative politics and discusses its majoritarian bias. The latter manifests itself in two ways. First, in the discussion of the quality of democracy exclusively in terms of the issue of accountability - a concept that is deeply rooted in the majoritarian normative ideal. Second, in the assumption increasingly made that the concentration of political authority is a pre-condition for accountability.

Cet article analyse les principales contributions de la littérature contemporaine sur la politique comparée et aborde le biais majoritaire existant dans les contributions récentes à propos de la question de la qualité de la démocratie. Ce biais se manifeste de deux façons principales: tout d’abord, par la réduction de la discussion sur la qualité de la démocratie, qui se résume à la question de la responsabilité financière (accountability) - un concept profondément enraciné dans l’idéal normatif majoritaire; ensuite, par l’assomption, de plus en plus fréquente dans le domaine de la politique comparée, d’après laquelle la concentration d’autorité politique est une condition préalable à l’exercice de la responsabilité financière.

The paper argues that unlike the predictions of the literature on second-generation reforms, there occurred an important change in the pattern of social policy during the Cardoso years, with the attendant improvement in social indicators. The budgetary process has been increasingly and extensively hardwired; inter-governmental relations have undergone extensive restructuring; and the line ministries in the social area have been insulated from coalition-building politics. It argued that the change was determined by the broader transformation of Brazilian federalism caused by an extensive process of constitutional reform, and that the executive had both the incentives and the capabilities to promote it.

Dans cet article, on affirme qu'il y a eu un changement dans le modèle de la politique sociale brésilienne pendant le gouvernement Fernando Henrique Cardoso, ce que la littérature sur les réformes de deuxième génération n'avait pas prévu. Selon le nouveau modèle, les mécanismes budgétaires se sont avérés de plus en plus liés au domaine social: les relations inter-gouvernementales ont subi un changement considérable et le rôle des ministères à caractère social dans la politique de formation des cabinets présidentiels a été redéfini. Ce changement est devenu possible grâce aux transformations significatives qui se sont produites dans le fédéralisme brésilien à la suite d'un long processus de changement constitutionnel. Dans ce texte, on montre que le pouvoir exécutif a disposé de capacités institutionnelles et a été poussé à mettre en place le changement.

Este artigo examina as trajetórias divergentes da Argentina e do Brasil no que diz respeito à capacidade tributária e à capacidade de promover reformas no sistema tributário. O autor procura explicar não só por que a carga tributária no Brasil é significativamente mais alta do que a da Argentina, mas também por que o Brasil teve mais capacidade de reformar o sistema tributário no período posterior ao regime autoritário. Defende, ademais, o argumento de que os fatores que explicam grande parte das diferenças observadas são, de um lado, a instabilidade institucional e, de outro, o arranjo federativo presente em cada um dos países. A instabilidade institucional é fortemente condicionada pelas instituições federativas (e também pela polarização de preferência entre os atores) e é determinante para o entendimento do trade offs com que se defrontam os governos no sentido de privilegiar determinado instrumento de extração de recursos da sociedade.

This article examines the divergent paths of Argentina and Brazil in terms of the capacity to tax and the capacity to enact tax reforms. The article seeks to explain why the tax share is much higher in Brazil and why this country was also better equipped to implement reforms in the post authoritarian period. The author reviews rival explanations and concludes that the factors that explain a great deal of the divergence under investigation are political instability and the federalist institutional arrangements. Instability is closely associated with federalism (and also by some preference polarization by both) and plays a crucial role in understanding tradeoffs faced by governments in order to privilege a certain instrument of resources collection from society.

Cet article examine les trajectoires divergentes de l'Argentine et du Brésil en termes de capacité fiscale et de capacité de promouvoir les réformes du système fiscal. L'article tente d'expliquer la raison pour laquelle la charge fiscale au Brésil est nettement plus élevée qu'en Argentine et pourquoi le Brésil a été, par rapport à l'Argentine, davantage capable de réformer son système fiscal à la période qui a suivi la dictature militaire. L'article examine les différentes possibilités d'explication et défend l'argument selon lequel les facteurs qui expliquent une grande partie des différences observées sont, d'un côté, l'instabilité institutionnelle et, de l'autre, l'arrangement fédératif présent dans chacun des pays. L'instabilité institutionnelle est fortement conditionnée par les institutions fédératives (mais, aussi, par la polarisation, de préférence, entre les acteurs) et est cruciale dans pour le trade offs auquel font face les gouvernements lors du choix des instruments d'obtention de ressources auprès de la société.

This article discusses current approaches to the study of institutional change and innovation in the global environment. Although there is convergence in policy innovation as a result of globalization, there is a tendency to emphasize homogenization and leave aside variety and heterogeneity. We examine current explanations of how policy paradigms are diffused and consider how these explanations have been applied to a specific policy domain, namely pension reforms. The case study of Brazil’s pension reform is presented in summarized form as an empirical illustration of the arguments developed in the theoretical discussion. We find that national responses to the influences of globalization are in fact shaped in crucial ways by domestic institutions and path dependency phenomena.

Dans cet article, on examine des approches actuelles sur les changements institutionnels et les innovations dans les politiques publiques, sous l'angle surtout de leurs processus de diffusion internationale. Bien qu'on y trouve une convergence en raison de la mondialisation et du rôle croissant des institutions internationales, il y a une tendance à souligner l'homogénéisation et à abandonner l'hétérogénéité des réponses nationales à ces influences. On examine ici les fondements théoriques des explications courantes sur les processus de diffusion et comment ces explications sont appliquées à un domaine politique particulier: la réforme de la Sécurité Sociale. À ce sujet, on présente brièvement une étude de cas à titre d'exemple empirique des arguments développés dans la discussion théorique. On vérifie que les réponses nationales à la mondialisation sont construites surtout par des institutions internes et par des phénomènes de path dependency.

Discute-se o conceito de racionalidade presente em três vertentes da teoria democrática contemporânea: republicanismo, liberalismo e escolha racional. A análise concentra-se no republicanismo, para examinar seus microfundamentos e estabelecer por contraste suas diferenças com as demais.

The concepts of rationality found in three branches of contemporary democratic theory - republicanism, liberalism, and rational choice - are discussed. The analysis focuses on republicanism, in order to examine its micro-foundations and to establish by contrast its differences with the others.

Delegação e responsabilização são dois pólos de uma tensão irresolvida no funcionamento das sociedades democráticas. Instituições que adquirem um papel cada vez mais importante nessas sociedades, como as agências regulatórias e os bancos centrais, exigem autonomia decisória para seu funcionamento efetivo. No entanto, a delegação implica crescente déficit democrático e insuficiente responsabilização dos seus dirigentes. O artigo discute a questão da tensão entre delegação e responsabilização, subjacente à criação de agências regulatórias independentes. Os argumentos freqüentemente utilizados sobre a lógica da delegação e do controle são discutidos. O primeiro refere-se ao papel do Legislativo no controle (ou falta dele) de agências independentes. O segundo refere-se à delegação de autonomia a agências regulatórias como uma escolha racional de governantes em um ambiente econômico globalizado com o objetivo de adquirir credibilidade. Tais argumentos são pouco persuasivos no debate público. Conclui-se que o desenho institucional nas democracias contemporâneas revela-se pouco capaz de gerar controle social e legitimidade.

Delegation and accountability are two poles of an unsolved tension in democratic societies. Institutions that acquire a more and more important role in these societies, as regulatory agencies and central banks, need a decision-making autonomy in order to enhance their performance. However, delegation implies in a progressive democratic deficit and insufficient accountability for the leaders. The article discusses the question involving the tension between delegation and accountability that underlies the creation of independent regulatory agencies. The main arguments concerning the logic of delegation and controlling are discussed in the article. The first one refers to the role of Legislative's control (or the lack of) on independent agencies. The second one refers to the delegation of autonomy to regulatory agencies as a rational choice for rulers in a globalized economic environment aiming to bolster credibility. Such arguments are not quite convincing in the public debate. Therefore, it can be inferred that the institutional framework in contemporary democracies presents a limited capacity to promote social control and legitimacy.

Délégation et responsabilisation sont deux pôles d'une tension non résolue dans le fonctionnement des sociétés démocratiques. Les institutions qui acquièrent un rôle de plus en plus important dans ces sociétés, comme les agences réglementaires et les banques centrales, exigent une autonomie de décision pour leur fonctionnement effectif. Cependant, la délégation implique un croissant déficit démocratique et une responsabilisation insuffisante de leurs dirigeants. L'article discute la question de la tension entre la délégation et la responsabilisation, sous-jacente à la création d'agences réglementaires indépendantes. Les arguments employés fréquemment sur la logique de délégation et le contrôle sont discutés. Le premier se réfère au rôle du Législatif sur le contrôle (ou le manque de contrôle) d'agences indépendantes. Le second se réfère à la délégation d'autonomie à des agences réglementaires comme un choix rationnel des gouvernants dans un environnement économique globalisé avec, pour objectif, d'acquérir de la crédibilité. De tels arguments sont peu persuasifs dans le débat public. L'auteur conclu que le dessein institutionnel dans les démocraties contemporaines se révèle peu capable d'être à l'origine d'un contrôle social et de légitimité.

O artigo explora analiticamente as especificidades do processo decisório das reformas tributárias e discute, com referência às iniciativas recentes de reforma constitucional no campo tributário, os interesses em jogo e o padrão de interação política entre eles nessa arena específica, caracterizada como apresentando grande complexidade técnica e média visibilidade política, e tendo como atores fundamentais elites burocráticas e os governadores. O autor conclui que o impasse da reforma tributária recente está ancorado em elementos consociativos do sistema político brasileiro, em problemas de ação coletiva por parte dos governadores, e na "geometria política das perdas" produzidas pela reforma. Finalmente, argumenta-se que os governadores se deparam com uma estrutura de incentivos do tipo "dilema do prisioneiro".

The article analyses the characteristics of the decision-making process of tax reforms. At the empirical level, it focuses on the patterns of political interaction among political actors with specific reference to recent reforms in Brazil. The reform arena is described as exhibiting great technical complexity and medium political salience, and involving basically bureaucratic elites and state governors. The author concludes that the recent deadlock in tax reform can be explained by the consociational elements of the Brazilian political system, by the "political geometry of reform losses", and by collective action problems encountered by state governors. It is further argued that governors face a "prisoner's dilemma" type of incentive structure.

Cet article analyse les caractéristiques du processus décisoire de la Réforme Fiscale, plus particulièrement des modifications constitutionnelles nécessaires à la Réforme Fiscale au Brésil, considérant les intérêts en jeu et le mode d'interaction politique dans cette arène de grande complexité technique et de projection politique limitée, dont les principaux acteurs sont les élites bureaucratiques et le gouverneurs des différents etats. L'auteur conclut que la récente impasse où s'enlise la Réforme Fiscale peut s'expliquer par les éléments consociatifs du système politique brésilien, par les problèmes d'action collective des gouverneurs et par la "géométrie politique des pertes" résultant de cette réforme. Finalement, à ceci s'ajoute l'argument que les gouverneurs des Etats doivent faire face à une structure d'incentifs fiscaux de type de "dilemme de prisonniers".